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CONSTRUCTING COMPETENCE: FORMULATING
STANDARDS OF LEGAL COMPETENCE TO MAKE
MEDICAL DECISIONS
Jessica Wilen Berg, J.D.
Paul S. Appelbaum, M.D. & Thomas Grisso, Ph.D.*
A young woman twenty-six weeks pregnant and dying from
cancer lies heavily sedated and attached to a respirator. Is she
competent to determine what life-prolonging measures should
be taken, or to consent to an emergency cesarean section that
may save her fetus but will probably shorten her life?1 A
quadriplegic young man wishes to end his life and requests a
court order granting immunity for the medical staff who will
unhook his respirator and administer sedatives. Is he competent to choose to die?2 A delusional man wanders into a psychiatric hospital and believes he is entering heaven rather
than a hospital. Is he "too crazy" to admit himself voluntarily?3 As these cases indicate, questions of decisionmaking com* Ms. Berg is a legal fellow in the Law and Psychiatry Program,
Department of Psychiatry, University of Massachusetts Medical School.
Dr. Appelbaum is an A.F. Zeleznik Distinguished Professor, Director of
the Law and Psychiatry Program and t h e Chairman of the Department
of Psychiatry, University of Massachusetts Medical School. Dr. Grisso is a
Professor and Director of Forensic Training and Research, Department of
Psychiatry, University of Massachusetts Medical School. This work was
funded in part by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
Research Network on Mental Health and the Law.
We would like to t h a n k Professors Richard Bonnie, Ken Hoge, John
Monahan, Stephen Morse and John Petrila for their extremely helpful
comments on earlier drafts.
1. See In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1238 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
2. See McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 620 (Nev. 1990).
3. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 114 (1990); Steven K. Hoge, On
Being "Too Crazy" to Sign Into a Mental Hospital: The Issue of Consent
to Psychiatric Hospitalization, 22 BULL. AM. ACAD. OF PSYCHIATRY & L.
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petence are inescapable in medicine today. A person's competence will have implications for whether he or she is allowed to
decide what type of treatment, if any, is received; whether
treatment is discontinued, including life-sustaining treatment;
and whether medical professionals implementing decisions are
exposed to civil or criminal liability.
The notion of competence in the medical context stems from
the law of informed consent,4 which has evolved over the past
three decades into a complex doctrine designed to promote
patients' autonomous decisionmaking.5 Autonomy requires
that the patient be offered an active role in the decisionmaking
process.6 This principle recognizes that although physicians
have technical expertise, patients have an essential knowledge
of their own subjective values and are the best judges of their
own interests. 7 There is also an intrinsic value in autonomy;
even if an outside expert is better able to make a decision, it is
preferable to allow a competent individual to make his or her
own choices.8 Embedded in the philosophical notion of autonomy are concrete requirements of capacity.9 To the extent that
431, 432 (1994).
4. Informed consent is a legal construct. Much of the jurisprudence
in this area has focused on the elements of disclosure, i.e., the amount
and type of information that must be imparted to the patient. Valid
informed consent also requires an element of voluntariness, or absence of
coercion, and a competent patient. See Alan Meisel et al., Toward a
Model of the Legal Doctrine of Informed Consent, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
285, 286-87 (1977) (describing the development of the doctrine of informed consent); PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL
THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 23 (1987).
5. See generally RUTH R. PADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY
AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986); Meisel et al., supra note 4,
at 286; APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 4.
6. Bouvia v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. Rptr. 297, 343 (Ct. App. 1986)
(citing American Hospital Association statement supporting premise that
"the controlling decision belongs to a competent, informed patient").
7. See, e.g., ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR
OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 29 (1989); Charles
W. Lidz & Robert M. Arnold, Rethinking Autonomy in Long Term Care,
47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 603, 605 (1993) (allowing patients to select their
own treatment maximizes their best interest).
8. Lidz & Arnold, supra note 7, at 605 (suggesting people are better
judges of their own interest than the most benevolent outsider).
9. E. Haavi Morreim, Competence: At the Intersection of Law, Medi-
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a patient's capacity is impaired with respect to abilities necessary to exercise autonomy, that person is less able to participate competently in the decisionmaking process.10
Presently there is a lack of both an authoritative framework
for thinking about legal competence and clear standards for
determining it. Cases and statutes generally lack sufficient
analysis of competence and its different elements. Terms such
as "understanding" or "rationality" may be poorly defined and
used indiscriminately.11 Even when a statute articulates a

cine, and Philosophy, in COMPETENCY: A STUDY OF INFORMAL COMPETENCY DETERMINATIONS IN PRIMARY CARE 93, 93-125 (Mary Ann Gardell

Cutter & Earl E. Shelp eds. 1991). Autonomy enables a person to "examine even his naturally given needs and desires and choose whether to
identify with them, shun them, or pursue them." Id. at 101. This requires the person to form a "coherent picture of the world and of his
place in it." Id. In addition, it is "essential t h a t the autonomous person
be generally rational in his thinking and judging processes." Id. Even
J o h n S t u a r t Mill apparently recognized t h a t limitations on liberty are
warranted when a person is "delirious or in some state of excitement or
absorption incompatible with the full use of t h e reflecting faculty." John
Monahan, John Stuart Mill on the Liberty of the Mentally III: A Historical Note, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1428, 1429 (1977) (citing J . S . MILL, ON
LIBERTY (1859)).

10. Competency and autonomy, however, are not synonymous. While
autonomy refers to the capacity to make independent decisions in general, competence refers to the ability to perform a particular task. Morreim,
supra note 9, at 102; Tom Beauchamp, Competence, in COMPETENCY: A
STUDY OF INFORMAL COMPETENCY DETERMINATIONS IN PRIMARY CARE 49,

61 (Mary Ann Gardell Cutter & Earl E. Shelp eds. 1991); cf. Lidz & Arnold, supra note 7, at 608-19 (identifying three academic models of autonomy, including total independence, free action, and effective deliberation, and proposing a fourth model: consistency with one's values and life
goals). The authors argue t h a t autonomy should not always be centered
around discrete decisionmaking models. For example, in nursing homes
autonomy should focus on the "relationship between patients' lives and
their goals and commitments." Lidz & Arnold, supra note 7, at 607. Competence and autonomy largely overlap in medical decisionmaking because
t h e focus is on "the patient's competence to do one basic task, namely, to
make autonomous decisions regarding his medical situation." Morreim,
supra note 9, at 102. The capacities needed to be able competently to
make a decision are necessary but not always sufficient to be able autonomously to make a decision (e.g., autonomy may be impaired by t h e
application of coercive pressure on an otherwise competent person).
11. See, e.g., Loren H. Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to
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standard of competence, it is often vague and provides little
guidance for those who must apply it. For example, what degree of incapacity suffices to establish incompetence under an
"understanding" standard? How much understanding is necessary and what does the patient need to be able to understand?
Do different situations warrant the application of different
standards or the demonstration of different levels of ability?
The first Part of this Article provides a conceptual clarification of legal competence and identifies a framework of four
relevant abilities that are elements of competence standards. It
offers a uniform vocabulary derived from competence standards
found in cases and statutes and proposes a framework for
characterizing four abilities associated with legal competence
to make medical decisions. Part II describes the MacArthur
Treatment Competence Study, which developed instruments to
evaluate capacity based upon the four abilities and applied
them to three patient populations: patients suffering from
angina pectoris, severe depression and schizophrenia. Finally,
Part III examines the policy implications of the foregoing empirical analysis for future reforms of the law on competence.
I. LEGAL STANDARDS OF COMPETENCE

Competence is a legal construct:12 in most jurisdictions only
a court can decide if a person is incompetent.13 Assessments
of capacity,14 on the other hand, are relegated to medical or

Treatment, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 279, 280 (1977) (listing a number of
terms which are used in judicial decisions and statutes "interchangeably
without sufficient explanation or clear behavioral referents"). Although
there has been some improvement, this continues to be true today.
12. "Competence" is used here in its legal sense. There is a vast psychological and social science literature in which the term may be used
differently.
13. See, e.g., Kristine C. Karnezis, Annotation, Patient's Right to Refuse Treatment Allegedly Necessary to Sustain Life, 93 A.L.R. 3d 67, 7071 (1979) (stating that due to questions of competency, cases where lifesaving medical treatment is refused are brought to the courts).
14. "Capacity," as used here, refers to a patient's present level of
decisionmaking ability, or likely ability when faced with a future situation requiring a decision. A determination of incapacity has no direct
legal consequences, although it may lead to an eventual determination of
incompetence. There may, however, be practical consequences of a
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mental health professionals. Legislatures, in drafting competence statutes, may determine what type and degree15 of clinically assessed incapacity will allow a judge to declare an individual legally "incompetent." Theories of competence to make
medical decisions focus on various criteria, the most common of
which, and the ones adopted by the law, are cognitive.16 Although the law focuses on cognitive impairments, there are no
uniform standards among the jurisdictions to identify the relevant abilities that, when impaired, constitute incompetence.
A number of authors have proposed different conceptualizations of the abilities that should be incorporated into competence standards. 17 Their diverse approaches contribute to the

physician's determination t h a t a patient cannot make decisions (e.g., the
physician may ask a family member to make decisions on t h e patient's
behalf). A determination of incompetence, on the other hand, brings with
it a number of legal restrictions (e.g., the incompetent person will be
legally prohibited from making certain decisions).
15. Legislatures often do not specify the degree of incapacity (except,
perhaps, in broad terms such as "substantial" or "minimal") required for
a finding of incompetence and instead leave t h e decision to the courts or
to clinicians. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text on the distinction between rules and standards.
16. But see Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Psychotropic Medication: Three Alternatives to the Law's Cognitive Standard, Al U. MIAMI L.
REV. 689, 692-94 (1993). Professor Saks analyzes three models: the different person test, the volitional impairment test, and the product of mental
illness test. See id. at 692. She concludes that the law's cognitive standard is the most attractive, but t h a t additional attention should be paid
to alternative theories to clarify the issues surrounding competence. See
id. at 694; Lawrence Hipshman, Defining a Clinically Useful Model for
Assessing Competence to Consent to Treatment, 15 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 235, 239 (1987) (proposing a "therapeutic alliance" standard, i.e., whether a patient is able to work with a doctor regarding
treatment); Harold J. Bursztajn et al., Beyond Cognition: The Role of
Disordered Affective States in Impairing Competence to
Consent to
Treatment, 19 BULL. A M . ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 383, 384 (1991) (suggesting an affective dimension to competence).
17. See, e.g., Elyn R. Saks, Competency to Refuse Treatment, 69 N.C.
L. REV. 945 passim (1991). Professor Saks identifies four categories: pure
understanding, modified understanding, understanding and belief, and full
reasoning. Under the "pure understanding" test, a patient must be able
to assimilate the information t h a t the caregiver provides. See id. at 952.
A "modified understanding" test, by contrast, requires t h a t a patient not
only comprehend the information, but also believe t h a t the doctor be-
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lieves it. Id. at 952-54. With regard to the "understanding and belief
category, Saks also differentiates between what she refers to as a "naive"
test (a patient must comprehend the information and believe the information) and a "sophisticated" test (a patient must comprehend the information and form no "patently false beliefs"). See id. at 955-56. As Saks herself admits, the sophisticated understanding and belief test suffers from
the need to establish what beliefs are "patently false." Id. at 965. She attempts to define patently false as encompassing beliefs supported by no
evidence. See id. Saks defines "full reasoning" as requiring a greater capacity to assess evidence than the "understanding and belief" test and
focuses on the integrity of the "reasoning process." Id. at 957. Integrity is
not defined. Saks merely notes that "the 'full reasoning' view requires
fairly intact reasoning ability." Id. Although Saks' categorizations are
closely linked to language found in cases and statutes, they do not adequately distinguish between different capacities. For example, her "sophisticated understanding and belief test is a compound standard that encompasses various abilities, none of which is adequately identified. As a
result, it is difficult to translate her legal competence requirements into
cognitive abilities that health professionals can evaluate.
The British Law Commission likewise only broadly defines different
capacities. In a 1995 report it defined an incapacitated person as one
who is "(1) unable by reason of a mental disability to make a decision on
the matter in question or (2) unable to communicate a decision on that
matter because he or she is unconscious or for any other reason." THE
BRITISH LAW COMMISSION REPORT NO.

231,

MENTAL INCAPACITY 32-41

(1995) [hereinafter LAW COMM'N]. The Commission defines the first requirement as encompassing both the ability to understand information
relevant to the decision and the ability to use the information in making
a decision. See id. at 37. The latter concept—ability to use the information—seems to include the ability to process information logically as well
as to acknowledge its relevance to one's own circumstances. Id. at 38-39.
Further explanation of the understanding requirement shows that it, too,
is intended to cover both factual understanding of information and the
patient's appreciation of its relevance to one's own situation. Thus a
number of different abilities are integrated into two articulated standards. The result is confusing: how does one evaluate an individual who
understands all relevant information and is able to process it in a rational manner, but refuses treatment for schizophrenia because he does not
believe he is mentally ill, and believes instead that "his brain has been
blackened"? See In re Witthans, No. CX-94-280, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS
934, at *2 (Sept. 27, 1994) (unpublished). Clearly this person fails to
appreciate the nature of his illness and the likely consequences of refusing treatment although he may factually understand the situation and
employ logical reasoning to arrive at his decision.
Other commentators have defined competence differently. See THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATING COMPETENCIES 2 (1986) (describing some of the
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confusion surrounding competence. Nevertheless, a review of
American cases discloses a reasonably coherent set of approaches. Following the pioneering work of Loren Roth et al. in
this area,18 Paul Appelbaum and Thomas Grisso identified
four potential components of competence standards: (i) ability
to communicate a choice, (ii) ability to understand relevant
information, (hi) ability to appreciate the nature of the situation and its likely consequences, and (iv) ability to manipulate
information rationally.19 Although the four-part framework
was suggested in previous literature, this Article reviews cases
and statutes to show that the components are actually reflected in, and in fact drawn from, the law.20 Thus it provides a
unique perspective—no other commentator has undertaken an
extensive examination of existing law in relation to the elements of proposed competence standards. 21 The following sec-

different approaches); BECKY COX WHITE, COMPETENCE TO CONSENT 154
(1994) (defining the capacities necessary for competence to include t h e
ability to process information in various specific ways in order to make a
choice).
18. Roth et al., supra note 11.
19. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent to Treatment, 319 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1635, 1635-36
(1988) [hereinafter NEJM]; Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, The
MacArthur Treatment Competence Study I: Mental Illness and Competence
to Consent to Treatment, 19 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 105, 110 (1995) Diereinafter MacArthur I\. State statutes and cases may use one or a combination of these components to establish competence.
20. The cases and statutes cited herein are categorized according to
which of the four components are explicitly articulated. This is not to
imply that the standard(s) for which the cases or statutes are cited are
the only ones in use in the jurisdiction in question. On t h e contrary, t h e
standard articulated is likely to have been tailored to the particular
facts, and the proliferation of compound standards found in statutes is
evidence that more t h a n one test is applied. "Standard" may be used
here to refer either to one of the four components or criteria, or to some
combination of those elements (i.e., a "compound standard"). The terms
"test" and "measure" are used to refer to t h e MacArthur instruments (see
infra P a r t s II and III), or the MacCAT-T (see infra note 148 and accompanying text).
2 1 . There are only three or four compound standards actually found in
the cases and statutes: (i) choice and understanding; (ii) choice, understanding and appreciation; (iii) choice, understanding, appreciation and
reasoning; or (iv) choice, understanding and reasoning. This final stan-
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tions will discuss each of the four elements in turn.22
A. Ability to Communicate a Choice
We define this least stringent component applied by courts
and legislatures as an inability to reach or communicate a
decision. The first aspect, inability to reach a decision, is demonstrated by a patient who simply cannot make up his or her
mind or vacillates to such a degree that it is impossible to
implement a treatment choice. Inability to communicate a
decision means that the patient is unable effectively to make
known his or her wishes regarding treatment. Many courts use
dard is relatively rare. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. Courts
that explicitly articulate some other combination of components are either
implicitly applying additional elements or tailoring the discussion of competence to the facts of the case.
22. One criterion missing from the above components focuses on the
reasonableness of the patient's choice. See, e.g., Roth et al., supra note
11, at 280-81. Application of a standard based on this criterion may be
unusually susceptible to the bias against an unpopular choice since reasonability typically will be determined by comparison with the options
that the majority of patients select. Id. at 281 (explaining that the standard is biased in favor of decisions to accept treatment); Saks, supra
note 16, at 951-52 (arguing that a reasonable result standard frustrates
the purposes of competency doctrine). Moreover, the standard is not necessary to protect autonomy since autonomy focuses on the process of
decisionmaking, not the outcome. But see Lidz & Arnold, supra note 7, at
606-07 (noting alternative definitions of autonomy). Thus an autonomous
choice is one that is the product of autonomous action, regardless of
whether its result is "good" or "bad." Standards should focus on the
decisionmaking process rather than the final decision. Likewise, competence determinations should address the capacity of the decisionmaker,
not the reasonableness of the choice. See, e.g., Beauchamp, supra note 10,
at 49-77 (arguing that "one who is competent to choose may not
'competently choose," and therefore "the latter use of the word
'competent' [should] be avoided"); cf Marc Stauch, Rationality and the
Refusal of Medical Treatment: A Critique of the Recent Approach of the
English Courts, 21 J. MED. ETHICS 162, 163-65 (1995) (making a distinction between non-rational reasons and irrational reasons, and arguing
that an "irrational choice" to refuse life-saving treatment is grounds for
incompetence). But see Andrew Pomerantz & Alexander de Nesnera, Informed Consent, Competency, and the Illusion of Rationality, 13 GEN.
HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 138, 141-42 (1991) (emphasizing the need for careful
competence assessments even when patients articulate rational reasons
for their choices).
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this element for a threshold determination of competence.23
Thus patients who are comatose or in a persistent vegetative
state are per se incompetent.24 Some courts have implicitly
adopted this criterion by holding that an uncommunicative
patient is incompetent.25 Used alone, this standard would offer the greatest protection for individual decisionmaking rights
because it focuses simply on communication and disregards the
decisionmaking process. It would, however, allow a number of
patients with poor decisionmaking capacity to make decisions.
Although ability to communicate a choice may be a necessary
component of competence, demonstration of this ability alone
does not necessarily entail the capacity to make decisions autonomously. Thus courts and legislatures have combined the
communication component with one or more of the others.26
B. Ability to Understand the Relevant Information
The most common ability required by courts and legislatures
in their competence standards focuses on the patient's comprehension of information related to the particular decision at
hand.27 Understanding in this sense is simply the ability to

23. In re Department of Veteran's Affairs Medical Ctr., 749 F. Supp.
495, 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (patient was delirious, semi-conscious, and incapable of meaningful communication); In re R.H., 622 N.E.2d 1071, 1073
(Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (mentally retarded patient had limited communication skills); In re O'Brien, 517 N.Y.S.2d 346, 347 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (describing patient as unable to communicate except through nods, gestures and
pressing of hands).
24. See, e.g., In re Estate of Loungeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (111.
1989) ("Obviously, a patient who is irreversibly comatose or in a vegetative state will be incompetent, unable to communicate his intent."); Morgan v. Olds, 417 N.W.2d 232, 235 (Iowa Ct. App. 1987) ("[T]he patient is
incompetent, as the result of being comatose . . . and unable to make
the decision.").
25. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz,
370 N.E.2d 417, 423 (Mass. 1977) (accepting, without examination, finding of lower court t h a t mentally retarded patient, unable to speak, was
incompetent).
26. See infra notes 27 and 54.
27. See, e.g., Ross v. Hilltop Rehabilitation Hosp., 676 F. Supp. 1528,
1533 (D. Colo. 1987); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal.Rptr. 297, 304
(Ct. App. 1986); In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 752-53 (D.C. 1979); In re J a n e
A., 629 N.E.2d 1337, 1339 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994); McKay v. Bergstedt,
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comprehend the concepts involved, especially in the informed
consent disclosure; it does not require the patient to comprehend the situation as a whole. Thus we distinguish between
understanding, and appreciation, which will be discussed in
the following section. While courts and legislatures always
include an understanding component, they often fail to define
it. The common language found in statutes—"understand the
nature and consequences"—may be interpreted to encompass
both an understanding and appreciation component.28 Part III
argues that although understanding and appreciation should
both be included in a competence standard, they are distinct
concepts that should be recognized independently.

801 P.2d 617, 625-26 (Nev. 1990); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1240-41
(N.J. 1985); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 474 (N.J. 1981); In re Nemser,
273 N.Y.S.2d 624, 626-27 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427,
431 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Miller v. Rhode Island Hosp., 625 A.2d 778,
786 (R.I. 1993); In re Virgil D., 524 N.W.2d 894, 898 (Wis. 1994); In re
Fadley, 205 Cal. Rptr. 572 (Ct. App. 1984); Aponte v. United States, 582
F. Supp. 65 (D.P.R. 1984); IDAHO CODE § 66-402 (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 32A-15 (b) (1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5126.30 (Anderson 1994);
Wis. STAT. § 51.61 (1994).

28. See, e.g., In re Schiller, 372 A.2d 360, 367 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1977) (expressing the standard for capacity as understanding the
condition, nature and effects of the proposed treatment, and its attendant
risks); In re Virgil D., 524 N.W.2d 894, 895 (Wis. 1994) (interpreting the
Wisconsin statutory standard for incompetence as inability to express "an
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting medication or treatment, and the alternatives to accepting the particular medication or treatment offered") (quoting text of Wis. STAT. § 51.61 (1994)).
The court held that the standard did not require the patient to appreciate the nature of her mental illness where administration of psychotropic
drugs is at issue. See id. Thus the fact that the patient denied any illness or problem was irrelevant to the determination of competence. In re
W.S., 377 A.2d 969 (Essex County Ct. 1977); In re Merrill, 531 N.Y.S.2d
201 (Sup. Ct. 1988). CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1418.8(b) (West
1995) (using language similar to Wisconsin statute and requiring ability
to communicate); 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 158(9) (defining capacity to consent
as understanding the nature and consequences of decisions); MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-601(l)(l) (1994) (defining capability to give informed consent as ability to understand nature and consequences of decision and evaluate risks and benefits); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2982 (Michie
1994) (same).
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C. Ability to Appreciate the Nature of the Situation and its
Likely Consequences
This criterion requires that the patient be able to apply
information that is understood in a context-neutral sense to his
or her own situation. Therefore, it is most often combined with
an understanding requirement.29 Patients who accept that
their physicians believe they are ill, but deny that there is a
problem in the face of objective30 evidence to the contrary,
would fail this component.31 Thus in In re Roe,32 the Massa-

29. Rodriguez v. Pino, 634 So. 2d 681, 685-86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994); In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 326 (111. 1989); In re Roe, 583 N.E.2d
1282, 1286 (Mass. 1992); Northwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d 1017,
1025 (Mass. 1991); In re Martin, 504 N.W.2d 917, 924 (Mich. Ct. App.
1993); In re Riebel, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 942, at *4; In re Thornblad,
1991 Minn. App. LEXIS 1218, at *9-10 (1991); In re Requena, 517 A.2d
886, 893 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1986); In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d
785, 789 (Morris County Ct. 1978); In re W.S., 377 A.2d 969, 973 (Essex
County Ct. 1977); Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986); In re
Rochester Gen. Hosp., 601 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (Sup. Ct. 1993); Belcher v.
Charleston Area Medical Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 838 (W. Va. 1992); In re
Romero, 790 P.2d 819 (Colo. 1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:1 dV)
(1994) (defining "capacity to make health care decisions"); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 23-06.5-02 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-103(1) (1995) (defining a "competent person"); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §
313.002(5) (West 1996) (defining "incapacitated"); V T . STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §
3452(3) (1994) (defining "capacity to make health care decisions").
Even where there is no explicit understanding component in a case
or statute, language referring to an appreciation component is usually
interpreted to incorporate an understanding requirement.
30. This may include evidence t h a t the patient's symptoms correspond
to generally accepted criteria for a specific diagnosis and corroborating
opinions by other physicians. Some commentators may still find this
insufficient. See, e.g., Virginia Abernethy, Compassion, Control, and Decisions about Competency, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 53, 57 (1984) (stressing
t h a t hope for recovery in the face of physicians' pessimistic prognosis is
not necessarily "a criterion of psychotic denial").
3 1 . People v. Delgado, 213 Cal. Rptr. 122, 124-25 (Ct. App. 1989)
(holding t h a t the state m u s t show t h a t the use of psychotropic drugs is
the least restrictive alternative available to treat a prisoner deemed unable to give informed consent due to his inability to perceive his mental
illness); In re Roe, 583 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (Mass. 1992) (holding t h a t a
ward of the state was incompetent to make an informed decision about
his use of antipsychotic medication because, despite medical evidence to
the contrary, the ward denied t h a t he was mentally ill); Lane v.
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chusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a man suffering
from schizophrenia was incompetent because he refused to
take his medication and because he denied he was mentally
ill.33 The court deemed him incompetent since the denial prevented him from "appreciating] the need to control his illness
with antipsychotic medication," and "the risks associated with
refusing it."34 On the other hand, refusal of potentially beneficial, even life-saving, treatment does not necessarily indicate
that a patient is incompetent. For example, in Lane v.
Candura?5 a Massachusetts Appellate Court upheld the right
of a woman to refuse amputation of a gangrenous leg.36 The
court found that Ms. Candura appreciated the nature and
consequences of her act because she accurately believed that
she was suffering from gangrene and would likely die without
surgery.
The appreciation criterion recognizes that delusional beliefs
properly affect competence determinations only to the extent
that they affect the patient's ability to appreciate the relevance
of information to his or her own circumstances.38 A patient
Fiasconaro, 1995 WL 584522 (Mass. App. Div.); In re Witthans, No. CX94-280, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 934 (Sept. 27, 1994) (affirming order of
trial court authorizing the involuntary use in neuroleptic medication for a
patient who denied his mental illness despite medical evidence to the
contrary); In re Muntner, 470 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(same); ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(d)(1)(B) (1995) (noting that denial of a
disorder when faced with substantial evidence of its existence constitutes
a failure of appreciation and is evidence of incompetence).
An appreciation criterion does not require that the patient accept
all of the doctor's beliefs as true. For example, the patient may disagree
with the label used by the physician. Thus a person can accept that he
is ill, but object to the specific diagnosis. For example, a patient can
accept that he hears voices in his head and appreciate the need for medication to stop the voices, but object to a diagnosis of schizophrenia.
32. 583 N.E.2d 1282 (Mass. 1992).
33. Id. at 1288.
34. Id at 1286.
35. 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
36. Id. at 1236.
37. Id.
38. See George J. Annas & Jean E. Densberger, Competence to Refuse
Medical Treatment: "Autonomy vs. Paternalism," 15 TOLEDO L. REV. 561,
580 n.63 (1984) (explaining that in order to qualify under the insane
delusion test, the delusion needs to be closely related to the subject mat-
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who refuses treatment because she thinks that massive discoloration of her leg is a result of dirt rather than an internal
injury is not incompetent merely because she is delusional, but
because she is unable—as a result of her delusions—to adequately evaluate the consequences of refusing treatment. Under the appreciation criterion, even quite unconventional beliefs do not negate competence as long as they do not interfere
with the patient's ability to appreciate the nature of the situation and the likely effect of treatment. For example, in In Re
Milton™ the patient refused treatment for cancer of the uterus because she preferred faith healing and believed (erroneously) that an evangelist, who claimed to be a faith healer, was
her husband.40 The court distinguished between her delusional belief regarding her marriage and her religious belief in
faith healing, stating that the "belief in spiritual healing
stands on its own, without regard to her delusion," and thus
she had the capacity to make treatment decisions.41 In essence, the court applied an appreciation criterion, since the
patient recognized and accepted the fact that she was ill and
that without treatment she would likely die.42
D. Ability to Manipulate Information Rationally
The ability to manipulate information rationally is the ability least often included in legal competence standards and it is
the hardest to operationalize. It addresses the patient's reasoning capacity or ability to employ logical thought processes to
compare the risks and benefits of treatment options. This criterion does not look at the outcome of a decision, but, like understanding and appreciation, it is concerned with the patient's
decisionmaking process. Thus, a patient who can understand,
appreciate and communicate a decision may still be impaired
because she is unable to process information logically, in accordance with her preferences. Conversely, a patient may employ
ter at issue).
39. 505 N.E.2d 255 (Ohio 1987).
40. Id. at 256.
41. Id. at 258.
42. Milton is illustrative of the difficulty courts have in distinguishing
between delusion and religious belief. Courts tend to err on the side of
religion and are generally unwilling to challenge individual beliefs.
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logical thought processes but base them on impaired understanding. Because of this, rational manipulation is never found
alone and is always part of a compound legal standard. In
Reise v. St. Mary's Hospital,43 for example, the court held that
in addition to meeting the understanding and appreciation
criteria, the patient must also demonstrate the ability to
"knowingly and intelligently evaluate the information . . . and
otherwise participate in the treatment decision by means of
rational thought processes."44 In In re Conroy45 the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a "patient may be incompetent
because he lacks the ability to understand the information conveyed, to evaluate the options, or to communicate a decision."46 In reaching this conclusion, the court utilized understanding, rational manipulation and communication components.
Inclusion of rational manipulation in a legal standard of
competence may seem troublesome because it could lead to
incompetence adjudications based simply on the unconventionally of a patient's decisions.47 If the legal standard is sensibly
applied, however, this fear is unwarranted. For example, in
United States v. Charters48 the Fourth Circuit held that a
"court should evaluate whether [a patient] has followed a rational process in deciding to refuse antipsychotic medication and
can give rational reasons for the choice he has made."49

43. 243 Gal. Rptr. 241 (1987).
44. Id. at 254; cf., ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(d)(1)(C) (West 1995) (explicitly requiring that a patient have the capacity to participate in treatment decisions by means of a rational thought process, in addition to the
ability to understand and to appreciate).
45. 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
46. Id. at 1240.
47. But see In re Yetter, 62 Pa. D. & C.2d 619 (1973) (holding that
simply because a decision to refuse treatment appears irrational or foolish does not mean the patient is incompetent); In re Milton, 505 N.E.2d
255, 256 (Ohio 1987) (reasoning that even though unusual, a patient's
belief in faith healing was a valid religious tenet and could not be disregarded).
48. 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987).
49. Id. at 496. (It is not clear whether the Charters court actually
applied the standard as stated.) See United States v. Waddell, 687 F.
Supp. 208, 209 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (stating that to determine the
defendant's competence the state should evaluate whether he followed a
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E. Compound Standards
Cases and statutes evidence a variety of combinations of the
four components.50 It is difficult to know the extent to which

rational process in deciding to reject medication and whether he can give
a rational reason for his choice); United States v. Ballard, 704 F. Supp.
620, 622 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (holding that the state had failed to prove t h a t
inmates were incompetent according to the Charters formula).
As we define the rational manipulation criterion, a patient need not
be able to give objectively "rational" reasons for her choice as long as she
can demonstrate that the final decision follows logically from whatever
reasons are offered. Cf. Benjamin Freedman, Competence, Marginal and
Otherwise, 4 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 53 (1981) (noting t h a t a "rational reasons" test should focus on the process of decisionmaking, not the end result, and should require that the patient provide both acceptable premises and a conclusion related to those premises). Thus, a patient who
based her argument on false premises, or who failed to produce premises
t h a t support the conclusion, would fail this test. Our reasoning criterion
would allow a patient to rest on any premises (even a false one) as long
as the conclusion drawn follows logically from those premises.
50. See Woodland v. Angus, 820 F. Supp. 1497, 1502-04 (D. Utah
1993) (utilizing the understanding, appreciation and rational manipulation
standards); In re Gordy, 658 A.2d 613, 617-18 (Del. Ch. 1994) (using the
understanding, appreciation and rational manipulation standards); In re
Osbourne, 294 A.2d 372, 375-76 (D.C. 1972) (applying the understanding,
appreciation, and rational manipulation standards); In re Moe, 579
N.E.2d 682, 685 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (adopting communication and
rational manipulation standards); In re Lambert, 437 N.W.2d 106, 108
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (utilizing the understanding, appreciation and
rational manipulation standards); In re Peterson, 446 N.W.2d 669, 673-74
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (employing the understanding, appreciation and
rational manipulation standards); Gleason v. Abrams, 593 A.2d 1232,
1235-36 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (using the understanding, appreciation and rational manipulation standards); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235,
1249-51 (D.C. 1990) (relying on the communication, understanding and
rational manipulation standards); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 410-13
(N.J. 1987) (using the understanding and rational manipulation standards); In re Lydia E. Hall Hosp., 455 N.Y.S.2d 706, 710-13 (Sup. Ct.
1982) (articulating the understanding, appreciation and rational manipulation standards); State Dep't. of Human Servs. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d
197, 209-10 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978) (utilizing the understanding, appreciation and rational manipulation standards), cert, denied, 575 S.W.2d 946
(Tenn. 1978), and cert, denied, 436 U.S. 923 (1978); In re Beth Israel
Medical Ctr., 519 N.Y.S.2d 511, 512-13 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (employing the
communication, understanding and rational manipulation standards); In
re Waltz, 227 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1986) (understanding, appreciation, rational
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decisions are being narrowly tailored to fit the facts of a case,
and additional components may be used within the same jurisdiction in different situations.51 In addition, some cases and
statutes clearly articulate one or two of the four elements but
also use vague and broader language which could be interpreted to include additional components. For example, in Thor v.
Superior Court,62 the court stated that to be competent, the
patient must have "the capacity to reason and make judgments," "a clear understanding of the risks and benefits of the
proposed treatment alternatives," and "a full understanding of
the nature of the disease and the prognosis."53 Although appreciation is not mentioned by name, it appears by the latter
statement that the court may have intended it to be a part of
the competence assessment. On the other hand, the court simply may have wanted to stress the understanding requirement,
rather than require that a patient be able to apply relevant
information regarding the disease and prognosis to his or her
own situation. Colorado defines incapacity to include someone
who "lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or
communicate responsible decisions."54 The addition of the

manipulation); ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.837(d)(1) (West 1995) (adopting the
understanding, appreciation and rational manipulation standards); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 44-66-20(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993) (relying on the communication, appreciation and rational manipulation standards). See also
supra note 21.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 496-97 (4th Cir.
1987) (articulating a rational manipulation criterion but noting that "it
would not be a competent decision based on rational reasons if Charters
refused medication out of a denial that he suffers from schizophrenia,"
seemingly referring to an appreciation criterion).
52. 855 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993).
53. Id. at 381.
54. Co. REV. STAT. ANN. 26-3.1-101(1) (West 1995) (requiring communication and understanding); see also ALA. CODE § 26-2a-20(8) (1992); Az.
REV. STAT. Ann. § 14-5105 (1995) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9-2 (c)
(1994) (same); HAW. REV. STAT. § 327F-2 (1994) (same); M E . REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 34B, § 11001(F) (West Supp. 1995) (communication and understanding); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-47-5(j) (1993) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 25-03.1-18.1 (1995) (communication); OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 30, §1-111
(West Supp. 1996) and tit. 43A, § 10-103 (West Supp. 1996) (same); WYO.
STAT. § 35-20-102(a)(x) (1994) (communication and understanding).
Other statutes refer to the ability to reach or make an "informed
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term "responsible" could be interpreted to mean that the person must be able to appreciate his or her illness, that the decision be reached by means of a rational thought process, or
even that the final decision be conventional. Missouri requires
that the person be able to "receive and evaluate information or
. . . communicate decisions"55—possibly combining the understanding, rational manipulation and communication components. Some statutes fail to define the terms with any specificity. For example, Utah defines "incapacitated person" as "any
person whose decisionmaking process is impaired . . . to the
extent that the person is unable to care for his or her personal
safety or is unable to attend to and provide for such necessities
as food, shelter, clothing and medical care"56—apparently

decision." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-661 (1993) (also requiring understanding and appreciation); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 755, para. 40/10 (SmithHurd & Supp. 1995) (communication, understanding and appreciation);
M A S S . GEN. L. A N N . ch. 201(D), §1 (1994) (understanding and appreciation); N.J. STAT. A N N . § 26-.2H-55 (Supp. 1995) (same); 1995 N.M. Laws
182(C) (communication, understanding and appreciation); N.Y. MENTAL
HYGIENE LAW § 33.21(a)(5) (McKinney 1988) (understanding and appreciation); N.Y. PUBLIC H E A L T H LAW § 2980 (McKinney 1993) (same); W. VA.
CODE § 16-30C-3(j) (1995) (communication).
One statute requires the ability to make an "intelligent" decision.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-601(a) (Michie 1991) (also requires understanding). Another allows administration of psychotropic medication against a
patient's will if the individual "lacks t h e capacity to make a reasoned
decision." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 405, para. 5/2-107.(d)(5) (1993); see also
Estate of Austwick, 656 N.E.2d 779 (111. App. 1 Dist.) (finding t h a t the
trial court's determination that Mrs. Austwick could not distinguish right
from wrong and lacked the capacity to make a responsible decision met
the statutory test).
55. MO. REV. STAT. § 404.805(1X2) (1995); see also D.C. CODE ANN. §
21-2011(11) (1989); KAN. STAT. A N N . § 59-3002(a) (1994); OKLA. STAT
ANN. tit. 30, § 1-111(10), (19) (West 1996) and tit. 43A, § 10-103(5), (6)
(West 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 126.003 (4) (1994); Wis. STAT. § 50.06 (1)
(1995).
56. UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-1-201 (18) (1995). Interestingly, this statute
could also be interpreted to encompass a "reasonable outcome" standard.
For example, decisional choices t h a t result in a person lacking food, shelter, clothing or medical care could be seen as an indication t h a t t h e
person's decisionmaking ability is impaired and therefore imply he or she
is incapacitated. See IND. CODE ANN. § 29-3-1-7.5 (West 1994); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 311.621 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990) ("make and communicate a health care decision"); MlNN. STAT. § 145C.02 (West Supp. 1995)
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leaving it to the courts to interpret the specific capacity requirements.
Clarification of commonly used elements and standards (or
identifying a vocabulary) is the first step toward assessing
policies and creating appropriate procedures for adjudications
of competence. Clearly enunciating the components of legal
standards, however, provides no firm basis for choosing among
them on either normative or empirical grounds (assuming they
identify different sets of presumably incompetent persons), or
for setting required levels of ability that maintain the usual
presumption that most people will be permitted to make their
own decisions. In addition, evidence is lacking regarding how
reliably standards can be applied to ensure that most people
who are unable to make autonomous decisions are identified as
incompetent, and that most competent persons are not identified as such.57 Moreover, without more information, it is impossible to comment on the relative value of different procedures (judicial or non-judicial) for determining competence.
The remainder of this Article describes the MacArthur Treatment Competence Study's empirical investigation of medical
decisionmaking competence and the implications of both the
data and the four-part framework for some of these issues.
II. THE MACARTHUR TREATMENT COMPETENCE STUDY

The MacArthur Treatment Competence Study was designed
to address clinical and policy questions regarding the abilities
of persons with mental and medical illnesses to make decisions
about treatment. 58 Although the Study is described in greater

("make or communicate health care decisions"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
159.019 (Michie 1993); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5403 (Supp. 1995)
("make or communicate decisions"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
11.88.010(l)(a) (West Supp. 1995).
57. The MacArthur data presented below do not address this issue.
58. Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, The MacArthur Treatment
Competence Study III: Abilities of Patients to Consent to Psychiatric and
Medical Treatments, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 149 (1995) [hereinafter
MacArthur III]. The study sought to provide answers to three empirical
questions. First, do persons with mental illness differ from non-mentally
ill persons in their decisionmaking abilities, particularly as they relate to
legal standards of competence? Second, if there are differences, are there
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detail in other publications, 69 a short summary of the instruments, methods and results is offered to set the stage for the
discussion in P a r t III.
A.

Instruments60

Instruments were developed to establish reliable and valid61 measures of decisionmaking abilities conceptually related
to t h e four major legal components of competence to consent to
treatment identified in the previous section. 62 Six criteria
were used to guide the development of the measures:
1. The functions being assessed needed to have close conceptual relationships with the appropriate legal standards of
competence.63

reliable demographic or clinical characteristics that could be used to identify patients who are at greater risk of manifesting treatment
decisionmaking incapacities? Finally, what patterns of deficits in abilities
are related to various legal standards of competence?
59. MacArthur I, supra note 19; Thomas Grisso et al., The MacArthur
Treatment Competence Study II: Measures of Abilities Related to Competence to Consent to Treatment, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 127 (1995) [hereinafter MacArthur II]; MacArthur III, supra note 58; Thomas Grisso and
Paul S. Appelbaum, A Comparison of Standards for Assessing Patients'
Capacities to Make Treatment Decisions, 152 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 1033
(1995).
60. This information is published in greater detail in MacArthur II,
supra note 59.
The initial research instruments were eventually modified to create
the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool [hereinafter "Tool"] which
can be used in routine clinical practice as a screening mechanism to
identify those patients whose ability in one or more areas is impaired.
61. Reliability refers to the instrument's ability to generate reproducible data (i.e., to measure a variable consistently). Validity refers to
whether the abilities t h a t the instruments measure correspond with realworld determinants of competence (i.e., they measure the abilities t h a t
are related to legal competence).
62. This information is published in greater detail in MacArthur I,
supra note 19.
63. Standard psychological assessment tools have always suffered from
an incongruency between the abilities they measure and the legal standards to which they are applied. See, e.g., Ruth Macklin, Philosophical
Conceptions of Rationality and Psychiatric Notions of Competency 57
SYNTHESE 205, 208-09 (1983); cf. ENQUIRY ON MENTAL COMPETENCY,
FINAL REPORT 231 (David N. Weisstub, Chairman, Canadian Commission
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2. The content of the instruments needed to be relevant to
the decision being studied. Since the specific concern was
whether or not to proceed with treatment, the instruments
needed to reflect this goal.64
3. The content of the instruments needed to be meaningful
to the persons being studied. 65

1990) [hereinafter CANADIAN COMM'N ENQUIRY] (listing a number of elements of decisionmaking capacity which should be evaluated including
the following: cognition/sensorium, memory and intellectual abilities,
thought content, thought process and context-specific functional parameters and relying on traditional psychological tests to examine these abilities and aid in competence determinations). For example, IQ scores are
limited indicators of one's competence to consent to treatment since IQ
tests measure general intelligence, rather than the specific ability to
make treatment decisions. The inferential step from general intelligence
to ability to make treatment decisions increases the likelihood of an erroneous determination of patient capacity. Although a low score on an IQ
test may correlate with a decreased ability to perform on any component
of competence, it is not sufficient, in itself, for a determination of impaired capacity.
64. There are a number of reasons for this. First, competence is generally recognized as being task-specific. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note
5, at 287. This is true even in the legal arena since competence to stand
trial is different from competence to make a will, and is distinguished
from competence to make treatment decisions. GRISSO, supra note 17, at
7. Global determinations of competence are becoming less popular as
evidenced by the trend towards limited guardianships (i.e., awarding
guardians the decisionmaking authority in only specific areas, such as
financial or major medical treatments, rather than awarding guardians
the power to control multiple aspects of a person's life where such intervention is unnecessary). Even those states which still allow for broad
guardianship powers generally recognize that the appointment of a guardian does not establish that the ward is incompetent to make all decisions. See generally SAMUEL BRAKEL ET AL., THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND THE LAW 375 (1985) (stating that the modern trend is to limit
decisionmaking rights only to the extent necessary to cure the particular
problem). Second, measures of performance in different domains lack relevance to the treatment decisionmaking context and may involve different
levels of complexity. Thus courts are less likely to view such measures as
accurate indicators of treatment decisionmaking competence.
65. Performance may be positively affected by the patient's greater
motivation to reach a good decision on an important issue. Conversely,
performance may be negatively affected by the anxiety which accompanies
difficult treatment decisions. Since the net effect of these factors is unclear, the content of the instruments had to focus, as much as possible,
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4. The content of the instruments needed to be sufficiently
standardized so that comparisons within and across subject
groups were possible.66
5. Measurements had to have objective criteria for scoring
that could be applied in a reliable fashion.67
6. The instruments had to be practical for use in a research setting and potentially adaptable for clinical use. Most
importantly, the instruments had to be able to be administered in one sitting and by interviewers without extensive
clinical training.
The instruments developed for the MacArthur study reflect
the four legally relevant abilities described in P a r t I and the
principles identified above. First, ability to communicate a
choice was operationalized as a patient's selection of a treatment option in a decisionmaking task. A patient who selected
an option received full credit, one who expressed ambivalence
received less credit, while a patient who did not choose an option received no credit.
Second, the information required as part of the understanding component was drawn from the requirements of informed
consent. 68 After simultaneous oral and written disclosure
on information relevant to the individual patient. Thus, persons with different disorders required different versions of the instruments.
Two questions embedded in each of the four components are: (i)
whether the patient has the ability to do something and (ii) whether the
patient actually evidences t h a t ability in a specific decisionmaking context. For example, a patient who has the ability to communicate may not
do so in a particular case. Likewise, a patient who has the ability to
comprehend information may not actually comprehend the pertinent information. The MacArthur instruments are tailored to the specific diagnosis
and can concurrently test a patient's capacity to understand and evaluate
the patient's actual understanding.
66. Although some variation of the instruments was necessary to accommodate the third requirement, the differences could not be so great
t h a t they did not allow valid comparisons. As a result, the content of t h e
instruments reflected information generally relevant to a diagnostic group
but allowed parallel versions to be generated for other diagnostic groups.
67. The development of reliable methods for assessing competencerelated functions would allow further research on these issues to proceed
with greater ease. Moreover, such consistency will likely be looked upon
favorably by the courts who will want assurances that scores on the
instruments are easily interpretable and replicable.
68. APPELBAUM ET AL., supra note 4.
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(worded at an 8th grade level) incorporating each element, the
patient was tested on his or her comprehension of the following: (a) the nature of the disorder, (b) the nature of the recommended treatment, (c) the probable benefits of the treatment,
(d) the probable risks and discomforts of the treatment, and (e)
an alternative treatment and its related benefits and risks.69
The disclosure focused on the patient's diagnosed medical or
mental illness. The patient was asked to demonstrate his comprehension of such information by paraphrasing it, then by
recognizing the items of information after their presentation.70
Appreciation71 was more difficult to evaluate since patients
could rationally disagree with their diagnosis or prognosis.
Only disagreements based on rigidly-held beliefs involving
distortions or denial as symptoms of psychopathology most
strongly suggested incompetence.72 Therefore, the appreciation component was operationalized as the patient's acknowledgment of his or her illness and the potential value of treatment or acknowledgment of these things after illogical premises underlying the initial non-acknowledgment were challenged.
Because the acknowledgment factor focused on the patient's
perception of the value of treatment, whether the patient
would actually accept treatment was irrelevant. Patients 73
were asked six questions aimed at assessing their acknowledgment of the following: (1) their symptoms (confirmed by the
69. MacArthur II, supra note 59, at 128.
70. Understanding was assessed in three ways: (i) subjects were given
an uninterrupted disclosure and asked to paraphrase it, (ii) subjects were
given each element of the disclosure separately and asked to paraphrase
it, and then (iii) subjects were asked to recognize statements (i.e., identify them as the "same as" or "different from" the messages in the disclosure) before moving on to the next element disclosure.
71. Paul S. Appelbaum & Loren Roth, Competency to Consent to Research, 39 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 951 (1982) (first identifying an
appreciation criterion).
72. See NEJM, supra note 19 (stating that a patient's deficiency in
appreciating the situation and its consequences is usually caused by
pathologic distortion or denial due to the patient's perception, impairment, treatment or the treating agency's motivation).
73. The appreciation instrument was not administered to community
control ("comparison") groups since they were not ill and therefore could
not be tested on this measure.
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hospital chart), (2) their beliefs about the severity of their
symptoms (confirmed by the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale
("BPRS")),74 (3) their diagnosis (confirmed by the hospital
chart), (4) the benefits of treatment for their condition, (5) the
potential benefit of a specific, proposed treatment, and (6) the
likelihood, if any, of improvement without treatment. 75 Patients who initially did not acknowledge any benefits to be
derived from treatment were asked to explain their reasons,
and were presented with a hypothetical nullifying those reasons. For example, a patient who denied the potential benefit
of a specific treatment (such as antipsychotic medication) because he thought that he was too ill to benefit from treatment
would have the inquiry re-framed in such a way as to negate
his objections ("Imagine that a doctor tells you a medication
exists that has been proven to help 90% of the people with
problems as serious as yours. Do you think this medication
might be of more benefit to you than getting no treatment at
all?"). Only those patients who continued to disavow the potential value of the treatment in the face of a hypothetical which
nullified their original premise received no credit.
Rational manipulation refers to the reasoning processes
employed in decisionmaking rather than the rationality or
reasonableness of the actual choice. The accuracy of the premises relied upon is irrelevant. A patient who scored poorly on
appreciation because of inaccurate beliefs about treatment
(e.g., the treatment would cause the person to shrink in size),
could still score well on rational manipulation if the patient
manifested a logical process of decisionmaking. Thus, a patient
who erroneously believes that treatment would cause him to
shrink demonstrates logical decisionmaking when he refuses
treatment because he does not want to become microscopically
small. This rationality component was defined operationally as
the degree to which patients demonstrated an ability to do the
following: (1) seek information, (2) consider the consequences of

74. The BPRS provides a method for rating the presence and severity
of psychiatric symptoms/signs manifested by a psychiatric patient, based
on a clinical interview in which inquiry and observation provide data for
the ratings. The version of the BPRS used in this study contained 19
items. MacArthur III, supra note 58.
75. MacArthur II, supra note 59, at 132.
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treatment alternatives, (3) compare two treatment alternatives, (4) consider numerous treatment alternatives at one
time, (5) consider potential risks or discomforts from treatment, (6) apply personal preferences consistently, (7) make
logical inferences about ordinal relationships (i.e., to infer that
A is the largest when given, A>B and B>C), and (8) distinguish
correctly the relative values of numerical probabilities.76 Patients were provided with a hypothetical in which they were
asked to choose a treatment. They were then questioned about
their treatment choice and evaluated on the eight variables
identified above.
The MacArthur competence assessment instruments and the
subsequently developed Tool77 do not function as replacements for the informed consent process and are not meant to
serve as substitutes for clinically based competence determinations; rather they are designed to identify possible impairments in decisionmaking ability that are relevant to the assessment of patients' competence.
B. Sampling Procedures
Once the instruments were designed and pre-tested, they
were administered to various diagnostic groups. It should be
noted at the outset that mental illness is not a homogeneous
category; many different types of disorders can be thought of
as mental illnesses and cognitive functioning can vary across
and within diagnostic categories.78 Thus, while discrete diagnostic groupings may afford grounds for making inferences,
one should keep in mind that competence determinations must
always be made on an individual basis. Two mental illnesses
were chosen for the study: schizophrenia and major depression.
Schizophrenia affects patients' thought processes and their
contact with reality.79 Numerous approaches to treatment ex76. MacArthur II, supra note 59, at 135-36.
77. See infra note 148.
78. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, TASK FORCE REPORT 32, THE U S E
OF PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSES IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 7-8 (1992).
79. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 273-

289 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM IV] ("Schizophrenia is a disturbance
that lasts for at least 6 months and includes at least 1 month of activephase symptoms (i.e., two [or more] of the following: delusions, hallucina-
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ist, most of which focus on antipsychotic medications.80
Schizophrenia is considered the most severe mental illness and
it affects cognitive functioning adversely.81 Major depression,82 on the other hand, is the most common major mental
illness, and while it usually does not entail as much thought
disturbance as schizophrenia, severe depression may also raise
questions of competence. The majority of research on competence focuses on these two disorders, allowing comparison of
the MacArthur83 results with previous studies.
The MacArthur study investigated decisionmaking capacities
of patients soon after their admission to an inpatient facility,
since evaluating subjects during this period maximizes the
possibility of studying a range of impairments, including the
most severe ones. In addition, decisionmaking by psychiatric
inpatients includes the right to refuse treatment, and the decisions are frequently made in the first few days of hospitalization.84 Mental illness is not equivalent to incompetence; many
people who suffer from mental illness, even the most severe
forms, are competent to make treatment decisions. Moreover,
involuntary commitment to a hospital does not automatically
result in a legal determination of one's incompetence, nor is
voluntary commitment a waiver of decisionmaking rights.85
Hence, persons with mental illness may be called upon to

tions, disorganized speech, grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior,
negative symptoms)." Id. at 273).
80.

TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 1759 (17th ed. 1993).

81. J a m e s M. Gold & Philip D. Harvey, Cognitive Deficits in Schizophrenia, 16 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OP N. A M . 295 (1993).

82. DSM IV, supra note 79, at 320 ("The essential feature of a Major
Depressive Episode is a period of at least 2 weeks during which there is
either depressed mood or the loss of interest or pleasure in nearly all
activities . . . . The individual must also experience at least four additional symptoms drawn from a list that includes changes in appetite or
weight, sleep and psychomotor activity; decreased energy; feelings of
worthlessness or guilt; difficulty thinking, concentrating or making decisions; or recurrent thoughts of death or suicidal ideation, plans or attempts.").
83. This research literature is reviewed in MacArthur I, supra note
19.
84.

PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: M E N T A L H E A L T H LAW

AND THE L I M I T S OF C H A N G E (1994).

85. See generally BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 64, at 375.
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make treatment-related decisions at multiple points during
their illness.
Along with the two groups of mentally ill patients, a third
group—medically ill patients86—was included. Comparisons
between the performance of mentally ill and medically ill patients enable researchers to draw inferences about the impact
of mental illness per se (as opposed to the undifferentiated
effects of hospitalization) on decisionmaking abilities. Patients
with ischemic heart disease (angina pectoris)87 were chosen
for the study since they matched the other two populations in
their high incidence of hospitalization, considerable chronicity,
frequent treatment using medications, and accessibility during
hospitalization for interview.88 Since one of our objectives was
to isolate the impact of mental illness, of greatest importance
was the fact that both the illness and treatment do not typically cause significant cognitive impairments.
The three groups were compared with subjects who were not

86. Many mental illnesses are thought to be biologically based. In this
sense they may be no different from "medical" illnesses. The term is used
here to highlight the distinction between mental illnesses, which are
thought to result primarily in cognitive, perceptual, mood and behavioral
impairments, and illnesses which primarily result in impairments of
physical functioning.
Overall, the degree of impairment of decisionmaking capacity resulting from medical illnesses is probably underestimated. See, e.g., Lewis M.
Cohen et al., Do Clinical and Formal Assessments of the Capacity of Patients in the Intensive Care Unit to Make Decisions Agree? 153 ARCH.
INTERN. MED. 2481 (1993) (finding 60% of patients have impaired scores
on a global measure of cognitive functioning, but only one-third of patients are judged by medical staff as incapable of giving informed consent); L. Jaime Fitten & Martha S. Waite, Impact of Medical Hospitalization on Treatment Decision-Making Capacity of the Elderly, 150 ARCH.
INTERN. MED. 1717, 1720 (1990) (finding that elderly inpatients scored
significantly worse than control subjects on tests of understanding and
reasoning, with physicians markedly underestimating the degree of impairment of the patient group). As a result, the relative effect of mental
illness is overestimated. By comparing both subject populations and their
community comparisons, the MacArthur study controls for the baseline
effect of illness per se on capacity.
87. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 104 (17th ed. 1993).
88. Symptoms of angina include steady severe pain and feeling of
pressure in a region of the heart, sweating, difficulty with breathing, and
variable pulse rate (usually tense and quick). Id.
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ill. Because a random sample of the community is unlikely to
match all three subject populations on factors which may affect
performance on cognitive tasks, comparison subjects were recruited and matched to each diagnostic group in terms of age,
gender, race, education and highest level of occupation. Standard diagnostic interviews were employed to screen out those
who met the criteria for either schizophrenia or depression.
The study was conducted at three sites: Worcester, Massachusetts; Kansas City, Missouri; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Ten research assistants who were trained to administer and
score the instruments 89 collected data from the subjects: 75
schizophrenia patients, 92 depressed patients, 82 angina patients, and 249 community subjects.

89. The instruments were standardized; that is, questions were asked
of t h e subjects in exactly the same way and the scoring was objective,
based on specific scoring rules r a t h e r t h a n subjective judgments about
the quality of the subjects' responses.
Although it is ordinarily desirable to have raters blind as to which
group a subject belongs, this was obviously impractical here. Therefore,
expectancy effects cannot be ruled out entirely. However, they are reduced by the fact t h a t researchers at each site had primary responsibility
for only one diagnostic group.
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C. Results90
There were three main findings of the MacArthur study.
First, patients hospitalized with schizophrenia or depression
more often showed deficits in their decisionmaking than hospitalized medically ill patients and non-patient comparison
groups.91 Most of this performance differential, however, was
attributable to patients with schizophrenia. Low performance
on the MacArthur measures can be mapped on a continuum
ranging from slight to substantial deficits. For this study, the
90. This information is published in greater detail in MacArthur III,
supra note 58. It is important to note that the data that follow probably
underestimate the prevalence of impairments among the various
populations. First, because of the delay between the hospital admission
and study participation, many of the subjects had already begun
treatment for their illness. Second, in some cases, both mentally ill and
medically ill patients who suffer from serious impairments were excluded
from the study for a number of reasons—sometimes doctors did not allow
the researchers to approach potential subjects in order to protect the
patients from intrusions or to protect the researchers from potentially
violent patients. In addition, the most severely impaired subjects would
likely have been unable to provide informed consent for participation in
the study or to participate in extended interviews. All of the excluded
groups probably would have manifested poorer performance on the
measures of decisional abilities than the subjects who were recruited.
91. The MacArthur study found that patients with mental illness more
often manifested deficits in performance on the measures of understanding, appreciation and reasoning than did medically ill patients and their
non-ill comparison groups (only 5% of respondents overall were unable to
express a choice, usually because of extreme ambivalence, and there was
no significant difference between hospitalized patients and their comparison groups).
Percent of Subjects Scoring in the "Impaired" Range
on the Three Measures
Measures

Schizophrenia

Depression

Angina

Comparison

Understanding

28.0

5.4

7.3

2.4

Appreciation

22.6

11.9

4.8

NA*

Reasoning

24.0

7.6

0.0

2.0

* See supra note 73.

MacArthur III, supra note 58.
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extent a performance was deemed inadequate or "impaired"
was determined by the relative infrequency of scores below a
certain point. Thus, "impaired" subjects in the Mac Arthur
Study were those who scored in the bottom 5% of the distribution of scores for the total study sample.92 Here, "impairment"
is an arbitrary measure—although it takes into account the
distribution of capacities in the general study population
(which is not necessarily representative of the non-study population), it is highly dependent upon the choice of statistical cutoff points. Thus, the percentages of subjects identified as "impaired" would increase if the cut-off were raised above 5% (e.g.,
"adequate" performance is defined as encompassing the range
of scores within only one standard deviation from the mean),
or decrease if the cut-off were lowered below 5% (e.g., "adequate" performance is defined as encompassing the range of
scores within three standard deviations from the mean).
Second, although patients with schizophrenia showed the
greatest impairments, the majority of these patients performed
in the "unimpaired" range on each measure—72% on understanding, 77.4% on appreciation, and 76% on reasoning. Thus
the lower overall performance on each individual measure was
due to a minority of patients within the schizophrenia group.
Moreover, examination of the correlations between low scores
on each of the measures showed that the instruments identified different subgroups of "impaired" subjects. Although approximately the same percentage of subjects scored in the
"impaired" range on each measure (one-quarter of the patients
with schizophrenia), the identity of the impaired group
changed. A substantial number of participants who demonstrated "adequate" performance on one measure manifested
92. This is a basic statistical means of identifying the lower end of a
range of scores—"adequate" scores include any score falling within two
standard deviations of the mean, and "impaired" scores fall below this
range. Courts and legislatures may find this number (5%) to be too high
for use in competence determinations and may prefer to set the statistical cut-off point so that a larger majority (i.e., greater than 95%) of the
population is presumed competent. It should be stressed here that there
are problems in using statistical cut-off points to set competence criteria,
and if one were inclined to use statistical data in this way, it would
need to be based upon epidemiologically valid samples, not the matched
samples utilized here.
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"impaired" performance on another. For example, of the 72% of
subjects with schizophrenia who performed adequately on the
understanding measure, 24.1% had impaired performance on
appreciation and 14.8% on reasoning.93
Third, although age, gender, race, education and highest
occupation failed to provide a basis for accurately predicting
impairments among the groups, patients who manifested
greater severity of psychiatric symptoms, especially thought
disturbances, also tended to manifest deficits in understanding
and reasoning. This finding was consistent with previous literature and research on cognitive deficits associated with schizophrenia.94 The following Part of this Article addresses the implications of these data for legal determinations of competence.

93.
Percent of Subjects with Adequate Performance on
One Measure who Show Impairment on Another
Adequate Performance on:

Understanding

Understanding
Schizophrenia
Depression
Angina
Comparison
Appreciation
Schizophrenia
Depression
Angina
Comparison

29.8
6.3
6.3
NA

Reasoning
Schizophrenia
Depression
Angina
Comparison

18.2
4.7
7.3
2.0

Impaired Performance on
Appreciation

Reasoning

24.1
13.8
5.3
NA

14.8
6.9
0
1.6

24.5
7.5
0
NA
21.8
11.9
4.8
NA

MacArthur III, supra note 58.
94. See, e.g., Barry D. Rosenfield et al., Decision Making in a
Schizophrenic Population, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 651 (1992); Paul R.
Benson et al., Information Disclosure, Subject Understanding, and Informed Consent in Psychiatric Research, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 455,
455 (1988) (stating t h a t people with schizophrenia demonstrated poor
comprehension); see also MacArthur I, supra note 19.
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APPLYING THE MACARTHUR TREATMENT C O M P E T E N C E
STUDY TO QUESTIONS REGARDING POLICIES FOR
DETERMINING COMPETENCE

The framework described in P a r t I and the data obtained
from the MacArthur study can be applied to two sets of policyrelated issues. First, they assist in formulating standards of
legal competence. There are three initial policy questions t h a t
must be addressed in undertaking this task: (1) which components of capacity should be included in a standard of legal
competence, (2) what degree of incapacity or deficiency on one
or more of the components should result in a determination of
legal incompetence, (3) and what specific information must the
patient understand, appreciate or rationally manipulate? There
are also a number of procedural issues t h a t can be explored
using the MacArthur data, including t h e following: the value of
competence screening for specific patient populations, procedural mechanisms for determining competence, and the weight
courts should give to data such as the MacArthur findings. The
remaining Part of the Article discusses how the MacArthur
data may help answer these questions. The subsequent initial
reflections on how the MacArthur data can help to construct
standards of legal competence should not be taken to imply
t h a t an empirical analysis alone will suffice. On the contrary,
we recognize t h a t the answers to these questions are influenced as well by normative criteria. Although we provide a
sketch of the normative issues, a full account is beyond the
scope of this Article.
A.

Formulating the Standard

Every jurisdiction faces the challenge of formulating a governing standard for decisionmaking competence. Existing standards, as noted above, whether developed through case law or
statutes, often contain vague and confusing criteria. 95 Case
law standards, in particular, are highly sensitive to the fact
situation of the case on which they are based, leaving residual
uncertainty as to whether other standards might be applied by
the same court in other circumstances. To improve the stan-

95. See supra P a r t I.
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dards used to govern competence determinations, a number of
scholars and committees have attempted to develop model
standards delineating specific requirements of capacity.96
The framework of standards for competence elaborated by
the MacArthur research group should help to order and clarify
the present confusion about standards by delineating the range

96. For example, the Uniform Probate Code defines an "incapacitated
person" as "any person who is impaired . . . to the extent of lacking
sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible
decisions." UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-103(7) (1994). (Under our framework
this would likely translate into understanding, communication and appreciation.) See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OP TORTS § 892A cmt. b (1977)
(stating that to constitute effective consent, the individual must be "capable of appreciating the nature, extent and probable consequences of the
conduct consented to . . . . "). The President's Commission for the Study
of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research
identifies three elements of patients' capacity to make health care decisions: "(1) possession of a set of values and goals, (2) the ability to communicate and to understand information, and (3) the ability to reason
and to deliberate about one's choices." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE
STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS: THE ETHICAL AND
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT IN THE PATIENT-PRACTITIO-

NER RELATIONSHIP 57 (1982) (internal citation omitted) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N]. A Canadian report on mental competence proposed
that "in order to be considered mentally capable to make a treatment
decision, an individual must have the ability to (a) understand the nature of the condition for which the treatment is proposed, (b) to understand the nature of the proposed treatment, and (c) to appreciate the
consequences of giving or withholding consent." CANADIAN COMM'N ENQUIRY, supra note 63, at 250. (Under our framework this would likely translate into understanding and appreciation.) Finally, Allen Buchanan and
Dan Brock argue that "[t]he chief elements of patient competence are: (a)
the ability to understand the relevant options, (b) the ability to understand the relevant consequences for the patient's life of each of the relevant options, [and] (c) the ability to evaluate the consequences of the
various options by relating them to his or her own values." BUCHANAN &
BROCK, supra note 7, at 83. (Under our framework this would likely
translate into understanding, appreciation and rational manipulation.)
Although all of the above formulations of competence may be intuitively
acceptable, all omit one or more of the commonly used legal criteria.
Moreover, the drafters of these and other models do not always indicate
their awareness of the existence of other potential standards, and often
fail to justify the choices they made to include one component in a standard and exclude others.
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of standards endorsed by the courts and legislatures. Formulators of standards should now have a common starting point
and a common vocabulary by which to compare the approaches
in various jurisdictions. Other standards than those identified
here may evolve, of course, but the burden should be on persons who deviate from the general common law and statutory
structure to justify their reasons for doing so.
Formulating a standard will begin with the identification of
the governing normative principles. On a normative level, the
choice between standards involves balancing the extent to
which a failure to demonstrate the ability measured by a component indicates impaired autonomy in decisionmaking against
whether such a failure is a sufEcient basis for limiting a
patient's decisionmaking authority. Although seriously impaired people should be protected, the right to make decisions
for oneself should not be burdened more than is absolutely
necessary. In consequentialist terms the issue is whether the
harm of incorrectly labeling autonomous agents as incompetent
is outweighed by the harm of incorrectly labeling
nonautonomous agents as competent. The former is a harm to
the patient's autonomy, or right of self-determination. The
latter is only significant to the extent that the patient's wellbeing is at risk; no harm results from allowing an incompetent
patient to make a decision of minimal effect or one that is in
keeping with his or her objective best interests. Only competent patients, however, are free to make decisions that are not
in their best interests. 97
Once the governing normative principles have been identified and, in many cases, balanced against each other, effecting

97. See generally BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 7, at 40-41. The
doctrine of "substituted judgment" complicates this somewhat. When substituted judgment is used, a proxy decisionmaker must decide w h a t an
incompetent individual would have wanted if he or she had been competent. Id. at 10. The final choice does not have to be in the patient's
objective best interest. As a result, although an incompetent patient
should not be allowed to make a decision t h a t is not in her objective
best interest, a decision can be made for an incompetent patient t h a t is
not in her objective best interest. This distinction is important as t h e
substituted judgment standard does not allow incompetent decisionmaking, but rather, effectuates the previous (competent) wishes of a presently
incompetent patient.
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the desired result will depend on crafting a standard that
results in people being correctly identified as competent or
incompetent. Three aspects of formulating a standard need to
be taken into account here. First, the choice of components of
the final standard is important, as different standards may
result in different people and different numbers of people being
identified as impaired. Second, the required level of performance, in a quantitative sense, must be specified. For example,
in addition to applying an "understanding standard," one must
also establish how much understanding is necessary: is it sufficient that a patient manifests understanding of only 50% of
the information that is disclosed, or must a patient understand
95% of what he or she is told? Third, necessary qualitative
aspects of performance must be identified. For example, a
patient may understand that coronary bypass surgery is aimed
at relieving the pain in her chest but fail to grasp that it will
do so (if successful) by creating a shunt to permit blood to
travel past an arterial obstruction. Is understanding of both
pieces of information necessary? The following sections will
address each of these three factors in turn.
1. Choice of Components of a Standard
Selecting the components of a standard, as noted above,
involves a combination of normative and empirical considerations. The first issue that must be addressed in this process is
whether a single standard will serve for all medical
decisionmaking, or whether discretion will be allowed in choosing components. Obvious advantages of a single standard include greater ease and consistency of application, with fewer
opportunities to manipulate the outcome by changing the way
in which a situation is characterized (e.g., construing a case as
involving a "high-risk" decision, thus altering the relevant
standard).
Although these factors weigh strongly in favor of a uniform
standard for all competence determinations, there may be
circumstances in which important policy goals can be achieved
by varying which of the four components of decisionmaking
competence are applied.98 These "exceptions" to the single
98. See, e.g., J a m e s F. Drane, The Many Faces of Competency, 15
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standard should be clearly delineated ahead of time and professional discretion should be minimized.
The American Psychiatric Association Task Force on Consent to Voluntary Hospitalization sets out such an exception by
suggesting the application of an "understanding standard" to
assess the capacity of persons who desire to admit themselves
to a psychiatric facility—regardless of the standard t h a t might
be applied to other treatment decisions." Under the Task
Force's approach, the patient would be required to demonstrate
t h a t he knew he was entering a hospital for t r e a t m e n t and
t h a t release may not be automatic. 100 He would not, however,
need to demonstrate an appreciation of the t r e a t m e n t (e.g., a
patient who thought t h a t treatment would be effective because
of interference from ultra-violet light waves emanating from
overhead fixtures may still be considered competent to admit
himself). This minimal standard of competence may be warranted, the APA Task Force argued, because of the low risk of
harm from voluntary hospitalization, particularly when the
patient's choice is confirmed by an independent professional
judgment, as well as society's interest in encouraging individual choice in this context. 101 Voluntary admission is linked
both with better treatment outcome and less stigma. 102 The
alternative, involuntary commitment, will likely result in a
greater (longer-term) deprivation of liberty. In this case, the
Task Force concluded, the harm to the individual (i.e., a minor
deprivation of liberty) should be balanced against the possible
harm of not allowing people who need treatment to get
help. 103 To the degree that we want to encourage individual
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17, 18 (1985) (arguing for a sliding scale of standards which increase in rigor as the consequences flowing from patient
decisions become more serious).
99. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, TASK FORCE REPORT 34, CONSENT
TO VOLUNTARY HOSPITALIZATION 8-9 (1993) [hereinafter APA REPORT].
100. Id. at 9. Most states use a "conditional" voluntary admission model which allows for the temporary retention of a voluntary patient for a
period of up to five days after discharge is requested, even over t h a t
patient's objection. This is generally used to permit the initiation of involuntary proceedings where necessary. Id. at 4; see also BRAKEL ET AL.,
supra note 64.
101. APA REPORT, supra note 99, at 7.
102. Id. at 1.
103. The balance of h a r m s depends on whether the people who would
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choice in this context, even at the risk of possibly allowing an
incompetent and therefore non-autonomous person to make a
decision, a limited standard of competence may be appropriate.
Whether or not exceptions to the general standard of competence are recognized in a jurisdiction, determining which components to include in that standard requires careful attention.
All jurisdictions appear to include in their standards of competence a requirement that patients be able to evidence a choice
and a minimal understanding requirement.104 This is based
on the normative judgments that a person who cannot evidence
a decision, or who fails to comprehend the information relevant
to a treatment decision, is not able to make even a minimally
adequate choice. We believe these judgments are sound.
Ought a jurisdiction stop with an "understanding standard"
or should consideration be given to the addition of appreciation
or rational manipulation components? The MacArthur data are
helpful here. If addition of the appreciation and rational manipulation criteria identify persons as impaired who would not
have been detected using an understanding standard alone,
there is a practical gain from incorporating them into a final
standard.105 In fact, the data suggest that the four components do identify different people as impaired. Application of
any one of the three major criteria (understanding, appreciation and reasoning) to the sample of patients with schizophrenia revealed impairment in approximately 25% of the group.

not be permitted to sign in voluntarily meet the involuntary commitment
criteria (i.e., there is an alternative means to enter the hospital). If these
individuals met the involuntary standard, then the harm resulting from
the deprivation of liberty that ensues from voluntary hospitalization
should be balanced against the possible deprivation of liberty that results
from involuntary hospitalization. If, on the other hand, voluntary patients
do not meet the involuntary criteria, and both voluntary and involuntary
hospitalization are thereby ruled out, then the balance of harms must
also take into consideration the detrimental effects of not getting needed
(and requested) help.
104. See supra notes 23*57 and accompanying text.
105. There might be other goals achieved by including appreciation or
rational manipulation, even if no additional incompetent individuals were
identified. Such an approach might serve to educate the public about the
dimensions of capacity normatively required before a decisionmaking
process is considered adequate.
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But use of all three elements conjointly resulted in more than
half of the patients with schizophrenia being classified as impaired.106 There are empirical grounds, therefore, for adding
appreciation and/or reasoning components to a compound standard, as many jurisdictions presently do.107

106. We would reemphasize here t h a t data reported below apply to
patients recently admitted to an inpatient facility and therefore represent
a more severely ill sample of people suffering from schizophrenia or depression then would be observed in the general population. But see supra
note 90 (noting that the data probably underestimate impairment in
hospitalized groups).
Percent of Subjects Scoring in the Impaired Range
on Compound Standards
Standards

Schizophrenia

Depression

Angina

Comparison

Understanding &/or
Appreciation

45.3

18.4

12.2

2.4

Understanding &/or
Reasoning

38.7

11.9

7.3

4.0

Understanding, Appreciation &/or Reasoning

52.0

23.8

12.2

4.0*

*These percentages do not reflect performance on Appreciation, which was not administered to comparison subjects.

Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 59, at 1036.
107. The case law and commentaries tend to establish a hierarchical
model of competence, see, e.g., Appelbaum & Roth, supra note 71, as
though t h e four elements of capacity t h a t might form t h e components of
a legal standard represent a linear progression of increasingly difficult
measures. On a priori grounds, it is difficult to quarrel with the conclusion that evidencing a choice is a threshold requirement and understanding is a logical predicate to appreciation and rational manipulation. The
results of the MacArthur Study, however, suggest t h a t a strictly hierarchical model is flawed from an empirical perspective. Although evidencing
a choice does appear to have a threshold function, understanding, appreciation and rational manipulation do not seem to represent increasingly
rigorous criteria. Instead, each entails approximately t h e same amount of
rigor, but identifies different, albeit partially overlapping, populations
with impaired capacities. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
David Weisstub, Chairman of the Canadian Enquiry on Mental
Competency, argues t h a t a rational manipulation criterion is inappropriate because it is indistinguishable from appreciation. See CANADIAN
COMM'N ENQUIRY, supra note 63, at 188. Analysis of the MacArthur data
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Appreciation has been incorporated into a compound standard of competence in many jurisdictions. The likely rationale
for inclusion is that people who fail to acknowledge that they
are ill or that effective treatment may be available (the most
common impairments of appreciation) cannot make meaningful
choices about treatment. People who do not know they are sick
cannot weigh adequately the risks and benefits of potential
treatments. Thus in Lane v. Candura108 the patient was considered competent to refuse amputation of a gangrenous leg
since she "appreciated] the nature and consequences of her
act" (i.e., that she would likely die without surgery).109 Conversely, in In re Roe,110 the patient was held to be incompetent to make an informed decision about antipsychotic medication because although he "understood] the risks attendant on
taking [the medication], . . . he clearly d[id] not appreciate the
risks associated with refusing it" (i.e., he did not believe he
was mentally ill).111 The MacArthur data suggest that a significant number of additional patients—24% of patients with
schizophrenia, 13.8% of patients suffering from depression, and
5.3% of patients with angina in the study population—would
be identified as impaired when an appreciation component is
combined with an "understanding standard."112 Taken together, the normative and empirical rationales constitute strong
justification for inclusion of appreciation in a compound competence standard.

shows that rational manipulation is distinguishable from the other measures of capacity. See MacArthur I, supra note 19, at 116-18.
108. 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
109. Id. at 1236.
110. 583 N.E.2d 1282 (Mass. 1992).
111. Id. at 1286.
It may be significant to note that in Roe the court appointed a
guardian to make a decision based upon what the patient would have
wanted had he been competent. Id. Thus any potential harm to patients'
autonomy may be lessened by the use of a substituted judgment standard
which seeks to maximize patients' right of self-determination by effectuating their competent preferences. But see Thomas G. Gutheil & Paul S.
Appelbaum, Substituted Judgment: Best Interests in Disguise, 13
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 8, 9 (1983) (criticizing this aspect of the substituted judgment approach).
112. See supra note 93.
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Whether a rational manipulation component is desirable as
well is a closer question. Analysis of the MacArthur data
shows a smaller percentage of people who understand and
appreciate adequately but score in the impaired range on reasoning.113 Jurisdictions that already omit this component may
do so because of the perceived likelihood of abuse. For example, there is the possibility that a clinician or a court will confuse the requirement of a "reasoned choice" with requirement
of a "reasonable choice," thus inappropriately shifting the inquiry from the decisionmaking process to the outcome.114
Abuse is possible, however, under any of the proposed standards, and there is no evidence that the rational manipulation
component is especially susceptible.
If, however, concerns over misuse of a rational manipulation
component are thought to outweigh the desirability of identifying persons with impaired reasoning, one alternative would be
to hold the criterion in reserve for exceptional cases.115 Thus,
a jurisdiction might identify specific situations in which the
criterion should apply, such as cases in which the patient must
choose between a number of complex alternatives, and thus the
possibility of error in application is outweighed by the harm of
letting potentially incompetent patients make complex treatment decisions. As the number of treatment options increases,
assuming only one option best satisfies one's interests, the
probability of choosing an option that is not in one's best interest is greater (e.g., if only 2 choices exist, there is a 50% proba-

113. 6.7% of schizophrenia patients, 5.4% of depressed patients, and 0%
of angina patients. See supra note 93. Note, however, t h a t even these
small percentages may account for a large number of actual patients
since hundreds of thousands of persons with each of these disorders are
hospitalized each year.
114. See supra note 22.
115. Permitting discretion in whether to apply the rational manipulation criterion may lead to a number of negative consequences including
less consistency in competence determinations and greater opportunity to
manipulate the outcome of a competence assessment by changing the
required abilities (e.g., adding a rational manipulation component) when a
patient refuses treatment. This may be mitigated, to a large degree, by
clearly specifying the situations in which a rational manipulation criterion should be applied. The less discretion allowed, the less possibility the
standard will be abused, or applied inconsistently.
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bility of selecting the against-interest choice; three choices,
66%; four choices, 75%).116 Moreover, as the complexity of
each option increases, a patient whose ability to process information logically is impaired may be more likely to fail to make
an autonomous decision (i.e., a decision in accordance with his
or her preferences). When the number and complexity of treatment options are high or the degree of risk involved is high,
there is a stronger argument for including a rational manipulation component in the legal standard of competence.
2. Quantitative Aspects: Degree of Capacity Required
In addition to which components are chosen, the degree of
deficits in ability required to establish incompetence depends
on how "impaired" performance is defined.117 Raising the degree of ability required for competence will result in fewer
subjects considered competent, while lowering the degree of
requisite ability may have the effect of allowing people who
show significant impairments to make binding decisions. In
setting competence criteria, courts and legislatures will want
to ensure that the vast majority of the population is considered
competent, but that the requisite level of capacity is not set so
low as to be meaningless (i.e., requiring almost no understanding, appreciation or reasoning).
One option is to use a fixed level of performance above
which an individual would be considered competent to make
all treatment decisions (e.g., understanding, appreciating
and/or rationally manipulating 75% of the information presented.)118 There are certain advantages to this alternative, including greater consistency in application of the standards, and
increased certainty on the part of medical professionals who

116. These percentages are based on the assumption of essentially
random choice in a state of incompetence.
117. See discussion supra Part II.
118. For example, instead of requiring a higher degree of capacity to
consent to an appendectomy than to consent to an x-ray, once a patient
met some fixed level of capacity she would be competent to consent to
any medical treatment. A fixed standard is akin to a "rule" discussed
below, whereas a sliding scale would entail application of a "standard."
See the discussion infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text on rules
versus standards.
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need to decide which patients' decisions to accept.119 In addition, the possibility of manipulating the standards according to
subjective judgments about a patient's choice is lessened.
The use of a fixed level of performance, however, has a number of disadvantages. The standard may be insufficiently rigorous because of the need to set the level of required capacity
low in order to accommodate the majority of the population.
On the other hand, the standard may be overly restrictive if
the line is set too high in order to prevent any incapacitated
people from making decisions.
Instead of using a fixed level of competence, a sliding scale
could be applied.120 This might allow competence determinations to take into account the features of the patient's situation, which many commentators believe is desirable,121 in a
less confusing manner than would result from varying the
components which are included in the legal standard. For
example, although a patient would be required to demonstrate
both understanding and appreciation for all treatment decisions, the level of understanding or appreciation may vary
according to the specific context. A patient who shows minor
impairments on the measures may be competent to make simple treatment decisions, but those same impairments would
cause greater concern when the treatment decision involves
more complex elements. Relevant factors to consider might
include the number of treatment options and the amount of
risk entailed in any one treatment option—risk being of
greater importance than complexity.
One author suggested that while a patient could consent to
"conventional treatment without demonstrating a high degree
of competency, a greater showing of competency [would be]
appropriate when the intervention chosen is of questionable
value and carries great risk."122 Although this would allow a

119. NEJM, supra note 19, at 1637.
120. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 96, at 60 (suggesting
t h a t the level of capacity should depend on the potential consequences of
the patient's decision).
121. See, e.g., id.; Drane, supra note 98, at 18.
122. Bruce Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 15, 43-44 (1991).
Another author requires that physicians first determine whether a mental
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great deal of flexibility, it is also highly subjective. How does
one determine the "conventional" treatment? For example, if a
patient in the end stage of terminal cancer refuses any intervention (including simple antibiotics) would such action be
considered conventional or unconventional?123 Likewise, determining what treatments are of "questionable value" is also
difficult. How should value be defined—extending life, easing
pain, or effectuating a cure?124 What if a patient refuses a
treatment that has a high probability of alleviating some of the
symptoms (and thus prolonging life) but holds no hope of cure?
Alternatively, what if the patient requests a treatment that
has a low probability of alleviating symptoms but is the only
procedure available? It would appear that considerations
should include more than the economic cost-benefit ratio of a
treatment, yet assigning a value to life, or quality of life, is
fraught with difficulties. These arguments demonstrate the
problems posed by requiring a greater showing of competence
based upon amorphous factors such as unconventionality of
treatment.
Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock argue that the level of competence should vary according to the "net balance of expected
benefits and risks of the patient's choice in comparison with
other alternatives," an approach that we find persuasive.125
Although this approach does not avoid all of the difficulties
identified above (as costs and benefits would still need to be
identified and balanced against each other), it makes the need
to address these issues explicit and insures that a patient's
acceptance or refusal of treatment would only be circumstantially relevant. Moreover, cost/benefit analyses (here performed
by the physician) can be tailored to accord with individual

disorder is present, then question whether the symptoms disable decisionmaking, and finally whether the decision is dangerous. Robert P. Roca,
Determining Decisional Capacity: A Medical Perspective, 62 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1177, 1190 (1994) (demonstrating, in Figure 1, how the answers to
these questions influence capacity determinations).
123. Winick defines conventionality as what treatment would be generally recommended by a physician. See Winick, supra note 122, at 44.
124. Winick looks at the risk/benefit ratio of the intervention in order
to determine "questionable value." See id.
125. BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 7, at 52.
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patient values, like mechanisms of substituted decisionmaking.
Thus the physician may consider the patient's subjective values in determining what counts as a cost or a benefit. According to this model, when the net balance is substantially better
than the alternatives, the patient need only demonstrate a low
level of competence. When the balance is equal to the alternatives, a moderate level of competence would be required; and
when the balance is substantially worse, a high level of competence would be required.126 This avoids the need to establish
which treatments are conventional, while at the same time it
takes into account the fact that treatment refusal may be the
most appropriate course of action.
3. Qualitative Aspects of Applying the Standard
It is as critical to determine which cognitive functions are
impaired as it is to identify the overall level of impairment.
For example, in a complex surgical procedure, substantial
deficits in understanding the technical aspects of the operation
may be common. If, however, a patient fails to understand a
basic feature of the operation (e.g., that general anesthesia
renders a person unconscious), such an individual should not
be allowed to make the decision. At issue is not the degree or
quantity of understanding,127 but the quality or content of understanding (i.e., what the patient understands).128
Informed consent law requires that a patient's decision be
voluntary, informed and competent.129 Each element, however, is not completely distinct from the others. For example, although the right to information requirement is generally applied to assess the nature of the physician's disclosure to the
patient,130 it also has implications for evaluations of competence. In other words, what the patient is required to understand or appreciate is linked to what information the physician
126. Id. at 53-57. See examples cited therein.
127. Whether the patient understands the information well, moderately
or poorly is not measured. See supra text accompanying note 121.
128. The MacArthur data do not provide adequate information on this
point since the study focused only on one form of consent disclosure for
each patient.
129. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 64, at 448; see also supra note 4.
130. BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 64, at 449.
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is required to disclose. In this sense, competence standards can
vary in accordance with the amount and complexity of information involved. As a result, competence standards have a type of
"built-in" sliding scale—more complex procedures involve increasingly complex elements of information which may be more
difficult to understand. The amount of information a patient is
required to understand will affect whether that person is considered competent. For instance, if we take the voluntary hospitalization example from above, patients would only be required to understand that they are entering a hospital and
that discharge may not be automatic. They would not be expected to understand all the legal aspects of voluntary hospitalization or the details of the hospital's procedures for dealing
with voluntary patients.
Relying solely upon quantitative data (how much the patient
understands) to evaluate competence may be inappropriate in
some cases. There are certain aspects of understanding, appreciation and reasoning that are so crucial to competent consent
that allowing a person to make a treatment decision without
these elements present would be inadvisable. A patient who
scores above the "impaired" cut-off point on a given measure—that is, he or she has not scored in the lower range of
the score distribution scale when compared to the rest of the
population—arguably should still be considered incompetent if
he or she has failed to demonstrate a particular capacity that
is essential for competent decisionmaking. For example, a
subject who is asked to enter a research protocol and understands the procedure she is asked to participate in but fails to
understand the distinction between ordinary treatment and
research, should probably be considered incompetent to consent
to participation in the experiment.131
In summary, all three factors—which components are included in a standard, how the standards are applied, and to
what information the standards are applied—will affect competence determinations. Clearly more research on these issues is
necessary before conclusively establishing a legal standard of
competence. At present, it may be sufficient to note that for-

131. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum, Patients' Competence to Consent to
Neurobiological Research, ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESEARCH 241, 248 (1996).
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mulating a legal standard of competence is somewhat context
specific, and as a result, different situations may require different application of those standards.
Moreover, the debate here reflects the classic "rules versus
standards" controversy in creation of laws. A "rule" is a precise
legal instruction "which requires for its application nothing
more than a determination of the happening or non-happening
of physical or mental events" (e.g., the speed limit is 55
mph).132 A "standard" is a less precise legal instruction
"which requires a comparison of the quality or tendency of
what happened in the particular instance with what is believed
to be the quality or tendency of happenings in like situations"
(e.g., no person should drive at an excessive speed).133 In theory, the distinction between "rules" and "standards" (using the
terms in their legal sense) is merely in the degree of specificity.134 In practice the issue is whether judges will determine
the law ex post in creating precedent, or whether legislatures
will determine the law ex ante in writing statutes, and whether
one option is more desirable than the other.135 At issue here
is how specific legislatures should be in drafting statutes (or
courts in formulating case law) governing competence determinations. There are several available options ranging from
identifying general characteristics of acceptable decisions (e.g.,
"sufficient capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions") to identifying the components of a competence standard
(e.g., evidencing a choice, understanding and appreciation). In
addition, the specificity of the nature and degree of performance required to pass each component of the standard is in-

132. H E N R Y H. H A R T , J R . & ALBERT M. SACKS, T H E LEGAL P R O C E S S :
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 139 (1994).

133. Id. at 140. In reality the distinction between "rules" and "standards" is not so clear-cut because the application of "rules" in certain
circumstances entails some uncertainty. Id. at 139; see also H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 151-80 (1961) (discussing t h e "open-texture" of
law).
134. See, e.g., Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 258 (1974) (discussing
whether specificity or generality is more efficient in legal rulemaking).
135. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic
Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 559-60 (1992) (noting the distinction between
whether the law will be deemed ex ante or ex post).
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volved, as is how they may vary according to the degree of risk
faced by the patient.136 Lack of specificity in statutes will
mandate either judicial, medical or administrative determinations of competence requirements. Resolving the dilemma between "rules" and "standards" is beyond the scope of this Article. The MacArthur data do not provide specific guidance on
this issue.137 Suffice it to say that lawmakers should carefully
consider not only which of the four components identified in
Part I should be included in a competence standard, but also
the extent to which the application of those standards should
be determined ahead of time, rather than left to judicial, or
even medical, interpretation.
B. What Procedures Should Be Used to Determine Incompetence1?
Competence determinations also raise procedural issues. For
example, should patients routinely be screened in order to
assess their decisionmaking capacity? What mechanism(s)
should be used to determine competence, and what role should
experts' opinions play in this process? The MacArthur data
also provide guidance concerning these issues.
1. Screening of Patients for Incompetence
Whether a screening mechanism should be used routinely to
assess patients' decisionmaking capacities depends on the cost
of applying the procedure to the target population balanced
against the benefit of identifying incompetent decisionmak-

136. Some states take this last approach for informed consent disclosure requirements. See Anthony Szczygiel, Beyond Informed Consent, 21
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 171, 212 (1994) (referring to lists published by the
Louisiana Medical Disclosure Panel specifying the degree and form of disclosure for particular procedures).
137. A number of authors have argued that the controversy should be
decided on economic grounds, comparing the costs and benefits of legislative rules versus judge-made rules. See, e.g., Ehrlich & Posner, supra
note 134, at 261; Kaplow, supra note 135, at 562 (noting that rules are
more costly for legislatures, whereas standards are more costly for legal
advisors or enforcement authorities). To the extent that the MacArthur
data provide information regarding the costs of competence determinations, they may have some bearing on this issue.
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ers.138 There are three factors that are crucial to this analysis: first, the cost of screening will depend on the method chosen; second, the degree of benefit will depend on the prevalence of incapacity in the population, or the base-rate; and
third, the benefit will relate to the extent of harm avoided. For
an unselected sample of the general population, competence
screening is probably unwarranted because the incidence of
incapacity, and the corresponding likelihood of an incompetent
person making a binding decision, is relatively low. The
MacArthur data show that the prevalence of incapacity is low
even among the type of medical patients included in the study.
It increases considerably, however, in the population of people
with schizophrenia, especially those recently admitted to a hospital.139 Even for this group, though, competence screening
may not be economically feasible except for the more severely
ill patients.140 Thus a maximally efficient screening process
would focus only on patients who are clearly thought disordered, delusional or otherwise severely mentally ill.141 As the
risk inherent in a decision increases (e.g., a patient with

138. Also important is the mechanism's effectiveness—i.e., its ability to
appropriately identify impaired or incompetent patients.
139. For any given measure, 25% of these patients scored in t h e "impaired" range compared to 5-7% of the angina patients and a mere 2% of
the community subjects. When all measures are combined, 52% of patients with schizophrenia showed impairment on at least one measure,
compared with 12% of angina patients and 4% of community subjects.
For more information see supra notes 91 and 106. Note t h a t t h e utility
of screening in a general medical population will vary depending on the
precise n a t u r e of that population, i.e., outpatients in a rheumatology
clinic are likely to have fewer impairments of decisionmaking t h a n stroke
victims in an intensive care unit (ICU). Extrapolation to medical populations other than the one included in this study should be done cautiously
with this variability in mind.
140. Greater severity of certain psychiatric symptoms was correlated
with greater impairment. MacArthur II, supra note 59 (Table 8—showing
correlations between experimental measures and scores on the BPRS and
BDI).
141. For example, in Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118 (1990), the
Supreme Court held that where a Florida statute required t h a t a patient
be competent to admit himself or herself into a psychiatric facility, hospital officials could be held liable for allowing the voluntary commitment of
a patient who thought he was entering heaven instead of a hospital.
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schizophrenia's decision to enter a high-risk research project),
so does the justification for routine screening.
An alternative screening method derived from the rationale
that the usefulness of screening is proportionate to the risk involved in patient decisionmaking is to focus on treatment
refusers. Most medical professionals do not question the competence of a patient who is consenting to treatment. This may
be due to the clinician's unwillingness to question a patient's
autonomy when the physician reasonably believes the patient
is agreeing to a procedure that is in his or her best interests.142 On the other hand, it has been argued that rejection
of treatment may function as a useful indicator of the need for
a competence assessment.143 That is to say, only patients who
are making choices that, in the judgment of their clinicians,
threaten their medical welfare should be subjected to rigorous
examination of their capacity to make treatment decisions.144

142. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 7, at 57-58 ("[I]t is a
reasonable assumption that physicians' treatment recommendations are
more often than not in the interests of their patients. Consequently, it is
in turn a reasonable presumption—although rebuttable in any particular
instance—that a treatment refusal is contrary to the patient's interest."
Id. at 58); Charles M. Culver, The Clinical Determination of Competence
in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF HEALTH CARE FOR THE ELDERLY 277,

282 (Kapp et al. eds., 1986) (arguing that a[i]t would rarely if ever be
irrational for a patient to consent to a suggested treatment, because
competent physicians rarely if ever suggest irrational treatments." Nevertheless, "[r]efusing a treatment can be either an irrational or a rational
act.").
143. See generally Steven K. Hoge et al., A Prospective, Multicenter
Study of Patients' Refusal of Antipsychotic Medication, 47 ARCHIVES GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 949 (1990) (discussing the negative effects on patients who
are deemed treatment refusers).
144. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 7, at 22. Compare Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343-44 (N.Y. 1986) (requiring judicial review
of patients who are thought to be incompetent and are refusing treatment) with Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458
N.E.2d 308, 310 (Mass. 1983) (requiring judicial review of all competence
determinations).
Using treatment refusal as a sole screening indicator may result in
a number of incapacitated patients being allowed to make decisions. For
example, one study of psychiatric inpatients found that the incidence of
treatment refusal was 7.2%. See Hoge, supra note 143, at 950. Compare
this percentage with the percentages of subjects in the MacArthur study
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All patients who refuse treatment are not per se incompetent,
nor should formal screening mechanisms be applied to all nonconsenting patients, but rejection can be used as a means of
identifying those patients whose competence should be examined further.145
2. Making Decisions About Impaired Decisionmaking
If impairment is suspected, who should decide whether the
person should be allowed to make his or her own decision
about treatment? The answer to this question probably depends on the mechanism used to identify those presumed to be
incompetent. In an acute psychiatric setting, use of widespread
screening would probably preclude, on economic grounds, exclusive reliance on judicial determinations of competence. Incapacity would be determined and decisionmaking power allocated by some less formal process. Extrapolating from the
MacArthur data, which demonstrated the presence of significant impairments in half of the schizophrenic population, there
would likely be a high incidence of hearings, especially involving patients with schizophrenia, representing a substantial
burden if the judicial system were employed.146 On the other
hand, judicial review limited to disputed capacity determinations (i.e., appeals of initial findings) may be a more feasible
alternative. While judicial mechanisms provide a significant
degree of protection for individual rights, they also entail a
number of disadvantages, including high cost and substantial
delay.147 Thus they are reasonably efficient only in a system
who showed decisionmaking impairments. See supra notes 91 and 106.
Moreover, the high incidence of non-compliance with medication among
seriously medically ill patients suggests t h a t many more factors (besides
competence) control treatment refusal.
145. Degree of risk associated with the patient's medical treatment also
may be sufficient to w a r r a n t competence screening, even when t h e patient shows no signs of a mental disorder and is consenting to treatment.
For example, it could be argued that patients faced with extremely high
risk treatment alternatives (e.g., cancer patients) should be administered
a competence screening device no matter what indicia are present.
146. The exact frequency of positive findings of impairment for particular screening measures would depend on the factors discussed in the
previous sections. The MacArthur data probably underestimate the prevalence of impairments among the various populations. See supra note 90.
147. The President's Commission noted that "resorting to t h e courts to
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that does not frequently require formal determinations of competence.
One of the primary concerns that led to the use of judicial
mechanisms in the past was the mental health system's reliance on unstructured methods of uncertain validity and reliability for assessing decisionmaking capacities. Eventually
technologies for structured assessment were developed but
initial instruments either did not correspond closely enough to
the articulated legal standards or failed reliably to identify
relevant impairments. The instruments used in the MacArthur
Study have been modified to create the MacArthur Competence
Assessment Tool for Treatment ("MaeCAT-T") for use in a
clinical setting.148 The MacCAT-T provides a standardized
method for assessing patients' capacities to make treatment
decisions, thereby reducing potential sources of clinician bias

adjudicate incompetency . . . is often burdensome . . . [and] the proceedings are in many cases so perfunctory and/or deferential to the professional expertise of providers that the role of the courts amounts to little
more than pro forma ratification of what was readily apparent to health
professionals." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 96, at 175. See also
FADON & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 97-100 (1986) (noting that informed consent requirements are more policy-oriented than legal); cf.
Grant H. Morris, Judging Judgment: Assessing the Competence of Mental
Patients to Refuse Treatment, 32 SAN DlEGO L. REV. 343, 431 (1995)
(arguing that law-trained assessors (not necessarily judges) are needed to
assure due process in competence hearings). Thus the Commission recommended that "determinations of decisional incapacity be made at the institutional level and that lawmakers be encouraged to recognize the validity of such determinations." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 96, at
175. See also Paul S. Appelbaum & Warren F. Schwartz, Minimizing the
Social Cost of Choosing Treatment for the Involuntarily Hospitalized Mentally-Ill Patient: A New Approach to Defining the Patient's Role, 24 CONN.
L. REV. 433 (1992) (arguing that the costs and benefits of possible approaches to substitute decisionmaking should be compared before selecting
a particular model). The MacArthur data does not conclude that judicial
hearings are inappropriate. In fact, judicial hearings may be more accurate and may carry strong symbolic value. See Dennis E. Cichon, The
Right to "Just Say No": A History and Analysis of the Right to Refuse
Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283, 395 (1992) (noting that "research indicates that the adversarial process itself may be therapeutic").
148. See generally Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, MacArthur
Competence Assessment Tool—Treatment ("MacCAT-T") (Draft Manual, on
file with authors).
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or inter-clinician disagreement regarding the patient's degree
of capacity.149 Employed properly, this tool, or ones similar to
it, may enable the utilization of nonjudicial mechanisms for
ascertaining capacity and allocating decisionmaking power,
thereby allowing greater reliance on the determinations of
medical professionals.150 For example, if a consensus can be
reached regarding the nature and degree of impairment that
would constitute incompetence in a particular situation, the
risk of error can be reduced since clinicians or non-judicial
reviewers would have clear-cut data upon which to base their
determinations of incompetence. Moreover, the use of identifiable data will also facilitate post hoc review of the process; in
addition to a physician's testimony regarding the factors upon
which she based her determination, there will also be test
scores available as evidence of the degree of impairment. Even
if judicial mechanisms are employed, the MacCAT-T or similar
measures can provide a structured basis for judicial competence determinations.
149. Test-retest data on the MacArthur instruments (used in the study
reported here) from which the MacCAT-T was derived show t h a t the
tests can be scored reliably and that the tests measure abilities in a
relatively stable manner. These tests are also sensitive to changes in
mental status that would influence the manner in which these abilities
are manifested in performance at a given time. See generally MacArthur
II, supra note 59.
150. Without additional data regarding the degree to which t h e measures correspond to legal determinations of competence, patients who
score low might best be seen as at greater risk of failing to meet t h e
threshold of ability associated with determinations of legal competence.
See, e.g., Rains v. Belshe, 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 185, 201 (Ct. App. 1995)
(holding that a statute which "permits an initial nonjudicial determination of a patient's incompetence by a physician or surgeon," does not
deny patients due process).
Another option is to institute quasi-judicial competence hearings
presided over by judicial masters or designated committees. States may
want to establish special hearing boards similar to those used in New
York for surrogate decisionmaking. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 80.01
(McKinney 1995) (noting t h a t "[t]he public interest [would] be served by
the establishment of a statewide quasi-judicial . . . process, which would
determine patient capacity to consent to or refuse medical treatment");
see also Clarence Sundram, Informed Consent for Major Medical Treatment of Mentally Disabled People, 318 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1368 (1988)
(favorably evaluating the efficacy of the New York committee system).
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It is important to note, however, that while scores below a
certain point on the MacCAT-T or other functional measures
may indicate problems in decisionmaking capacity, they do not
in themselves mean that the patient is incompetent. Notwithstanding the tests' ability to identify subjects with impairments, low scores on any of the measures should not be taken
as de facto determinants of incompetence. In this sense, patients who score low might be best seen as at greater risk (the
lower the scores, the greater the risk) of failing to meet the
threshold of ability associated with determinations of legal
competence. As a result, more data are needed regarding the
degree to which the measures correspond to legal determinations of competence before recommending substantial reliance,
in judicial or even less formal settings, on structured methods
such as those used in the MacArthur study.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The MacArthur Treatment Competence study provides an
important step towards developing usable legal standards of
competence for medical decisionmaking by identifying a conceptualization of competence that can be used to guide further
endeavors. Moreover, the framework and issues this Article
addresses can be used to formulate standards of competence
for other areas of decisionmaking beyond the medical treatment context.151 Although the need to standardize legal determinations of competence is apparent, courts and legislatures
should explore the policy implications of the various alternatives before authorizing adoption of a particular standard in a
given context. As the answers to the remaining questions become clearer, we can move not only towards constructing usable standards, but also towards developing systematic procedures for evaluating and determining competence in other
legal domains.
151. See, e.g., Steven K. Hoge et al., The MacArthur Adjudicative Competence Study I: Development of a Research Instrument (draft manuscript,
on file with authors, 1996); Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539
(1993) (discussing the various tests administered for assessing "competence" among criminal defendants and how the tests are based on context).

